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Abstract
Reiter’s original definition of default logic allows for the applica-
tion of a default that contradicts a previously applied one. We call
failure this condition. The possibility of generating failures has been
in the past considered as a semantical problem, and variants have
been proposed to solve it. We show that it is instead a computational
feature that is needed to encode some domains into default logic.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of default logic [Rei80], semantical problems of the
original definition have been identified, and variants have been proposed
to solve them [Luk88, Bre91, Ryc91, DSJ94, GM94, MT95]. One of the
problems with Reiter’s definition is that the application of a sequence of
defaults may lead to failure. The following example shows this problem.
T =
〈{
a : b
c
,
c : a
¬b
}
, {a}
〉
The default a:b
c
entails c whenever a is true and b is consistent with our
current knowledge. The application of this default makes c true, therefore
making the second default c:a
¬b
applicable, which makes b false. This result is
however in contradiction with the assumption of consistency of b we made
for applying the first default.
We call failure the condition in which the application of another default
makes a default that has already been applied inapplicable. In other words,
if the application of a default contradicts the assumption of a default that
has already been applied, this is a failure. The possibility of failures has been
in the past considered a drawback, especially because failures may make the
evaluation of theories like T impossible (i.e., these theories have no exten-
sions.)
A typical solution to this problem is to refrain from applying defaults that
would lead to failure. This is done by justified default logic [Luk88], con-
strained default logic [DSJ94], and cumulative default logic [Bre91, GM94].
For the theory T above, the application of the first default makes c true,
but the second default is not applied because it would lead to failure. We
therefore conclude that T is equivalent to the propositional theory {a, c}.
This solution is semantically good, as it it allows for the evaluation of
theories like T (i.e., it assigns extensions to theories that would otherwise
have none.) On the other hand, having forbidden failures can be seen as a
computational problem, as the encoding of some domains requires exactly this
“ability to fail.” An example is the translation from reasoning about actions
to default logic proposed by Turner [Tur97]. This translation generates all
possible evaluations of a variable x by means of a pair of defaults :x
x
and
¬x
¬x
, and then removes the unwanted evaluations by generating failures. For
example, the simple theory {Holds(Alive, S0)}, telling that Fred is alive in
the initial state, is translated into the following default theory:
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〈{
: Holds(Alive, S0)
Holds(Alive, S0)
,
: ¬Holds(Alive, S0)
¬Holds(Alive, S0)
,
¬Holds(Alive, S0) :
false
}
, ∅
〉
Either the first or the second default can be applied, but not both. De-
pending on which one we decide to apply, we obtain Holds(Alive, S0) or
¬Holds(Alive, S0). The third default generates a failure whenever ¬Holds(Alive, S0)
is true. The only possible remaining case is therefore that in whichHolds(Alive, S0)
is true. In other words, the first two defaults generate all possible evaluations
of Holds(Alive, S0) and the third default deletes the one we do not want.
In general, some defaults generate all possible evaluations of the fluents and
some other defaults delete the ones that are not possible. The latter are
called killing defaults by Cholewinski, Marek, Mikitiuk, and Truszczynski
[CMMT95], who presented other reductions where killing defaults are used
to delete unwanted solutions. Since this deletion is realized by generating
a failure, these translations do not work for semantics where failure is im-
possible, such as justified default logic [Luk88]. The inability to fail can be
therefore seen as a limitation, as some translations from other formalisms
into default logics require failures.
In this paper, we consider the problem of translating default semantics
that can fail (fail-prone) into default semantics where failure is impossible
(fail-safe). In order for the results to abstract over the specific semantics,
we consider a sufficiently general definition of “semantics of default logic”,
based on the concept of process [FM92, AS94, FM94, Ant99]. We formalize
the concept of fail-safeness in this framework, and investigate the translability
from fail-prone into fail-safe semantics.
The translations we consider are polynomial either in time or size of the
result. We consider translations that preserve the skeptical consequences, or
the extensions, or the processes of a default theory.
The least constrained form of translation is that translating the inference
problem: given a theory 〈D,W 〉 and a formula p we require the translation
to produce another theory 〈D′,W ′〉 and another formula p′ in such a way
〈D,W 〉 |= p holds in one semantics if and only if 〈D′,W ′〉 |= p′ holds in
the other one. Such translations are possible in polynomial time between
all semantics that have the same complexity. For example, we can translate
Reiter’s default logic into justified default logic in this way as both semantics
are Πp2-complete [Got92, Sti92, CS93].
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We extend this result by simplifying the translation of p into p′: we indeed
show a translation such that 〈D,W 〉 |= p holds if and only if 〈D′,W ′〉 |= a∨p
holds, where a is a new variable. Intuitively, the new variable expresses the
condition of failure in a semantics that cannot fail: by setting a to true
whenever a failure should be necessary, the generated extension implies a∨p,
and is thus irrelevant to skeptical entailment.
Using this translation, the extensions of the theories 〈D,W 〉 and 〈D′,W ′〉
are not the same. We therefore consider translations that preserve the ex-
tensions: such translations are called faithful [Kon88, Got95]. Clearly, no
faithful translation is possible from a semantics that may not have exten-
sions to one that always have. This is how Delgrande and Schaub [DS03],
for example, have shown that Reiter’s default logic cannot be translated into
justified default logic. However, the question remains if this impossibility is
only due to a possible lack of extensions. We therefore restrict to the case
in which the original theory has at least one extension and prove that an
extension-preserving translation exists or not depending on what we assume
to be polynomial: the running time of the translation or the size of the result.
Finally, we consider translations preserving the processes of a default
theory. Processes are the basic semantic notion of the operational semantics
for default logic [FM92, AS94, FM94, Ant99]; they are sequences of defaults
that can be applied in a default theory. Since two or more processes may
correspond to the same extension, two default theories may have the same
extensions but different processes. Therefore, translations that preserve the
processes can be considered as the “most preserving” ones.
2 Definitions
2.1 Default Logics
We use the operational semantics for default logics. Two slightly different
operational semantics for default logics have been given independently by
Antoniou and Sperschneider [AS94, Ant99] and by Froidevaux and Men-
gin [FM92, FM94]. A default is a rule of the form:
d =
α : β
γ
The formulae α, β, and γ are called the precondition, the justification,
and the consequence of d, and are denoted as prec(d), just(d), and cons(d),
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respectively. This notation is extended to sets and sequences of defaults
in the obvious way. A default is applicable if its precondition is true and
its justification is consistent; if this is the case, its consequence should be
considered true.
A default theory is a pair 〈D,W 〉 where D is a set of defaults and W is a
consistent theory, called the background theory. We assume that all formulae
are propositional, the alphabet and the set D are finite, and all defaults have
a single justification. The assumption that W is consistent is not standard;
however, all known semantics give the same evaluation when the background
theory is inconsistent. We define a process to be a sequence of defaults that
can be applied starting from the background theory.
Definition 1 A process of a default theory 〈D,W 〉 is a sequence of defaults
Π such that W ∪ cons(Π) is consistent and W ∪ cons(Π[d]) |= prec(d) for
every default d ∈ Π, where Π[d] denotes the sequence of defaults preceeding d
in Π.
The definition of processes only takes into account the preconditions and
the consequences of defaults. This is because the interpretation of the justifi-
cations depends on the semantics. All semantics select a set of processes that
satisfy two conditions: successfulness and closure. Intuitively, successfulness
means that the justifications of the applied defaults are not contradicted;
closure means that no other default should be applied.
The particular definition of successfulness and closure depend on the spe-
cific semantics. The following are the definitions used by Reiter’s and con-
strained default logic.
Successfulness:
Local: for each d ∈ Π, the set W ∪ cons(Π) ∪ just(d) is consistent;
Global: W ∪ cons(Π) ∪ just(Π) is consistent.
Closure:
Inapplicability: no default d 6∈ Π is applicable to Π, i.e., either W ∪
cons(Π) 6|= prec(d) or W ∪ cons(Π) ∪ just(d) is inconsistent;
Maximality: for any d 6∈ Π, the sequence Π · [d] is not a globally
successful process.
6
We abstract the notions of successfulness and closure from the particular
semantics, and define them to be two conditions on Π and 〈D,W 〉 such that:
1. successfulness is antimonotonic: if Π · Π′ is successful, then Π is suc-
cessful;
2. [ ] is a successful process, if W is consistent;
3. successfulness and closure can be expressed as the combination of a
number of consistency tests over the formulae in Π and 〈D,W 〉;
4. these consistency tests are independent on the order of defaults in Π;
5. the combination of the results of these consistency tests results can be
done in polynomial time.
A default logic semantics defined in terms of two conditions of successful-
ness and closure that satisfy these assumptions is called regular. Most default
logic semantics are regular: the only exception known to the author is the
semantics of concise extensions, which is not regular because the condition
of subsumption requires checking all possible default orderings [Ryc91].
We remark that the last condition does not imply that successfulness
and closure can be checked in polynomial time: they can only be checked in
polynomial time once the consistency/entailment tests have been done. This
is typically the case: for example, Reiter’s default logic closure condition
amounts to check whether, for every d 6∈ Π, either W ∪ cons(Π) 6|= prec(d) or
W ∪ cons(Π)∪ just(d) is inconsistent. Once we have checked the consistency
of W ∪ cons(Π) ∪ ¬prec(d) and W ∪ cons(Π) ∪ just(d) for every d 6∈ Π,
determining whether closure is satisfied can be done in linear time.
An extension of a default theory is the deductive closure of W ∪ cons(Π)
where Π is a successful and closed process. Note that more than one process
may generate the same extension. The skeptical consequences of a default
theory are the formulae that are entailed by all its extensions. The credulous
consequences are those implied by some of its extensions.
Fail-safeness of a semantics is formalized as follows.
Definition 2 (Fail-Safe Semantics) A regular semantics for default logic
is fail-safe if, for every default theory, any successful process is the prefix of
a successful and closed process.
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This definition formalizes the idea that a sequence of defaults cannot
generate a failure: if we can apply a sequence of defaults, then an extension
will be eventually generated, possibly after applying some other defaults. In
other words, the situation in which we apply some defaults but then find
out that we do not generate an extension never occurs. Fail-safeness is a
form of commitment to defaults: if we apply a default, we never end up with
contradicting its assumption.
Fail-safeness can also be seen as a form of monotonicity of processes w.r.t.
to sets of defaults: if a semantics is fail-safe, then adding some defaults to a
theory may only extend the successful and closed process of the theory and
create new ones. However, this form of monotonicity is not the same as that
typically used in the literature, which is defined in terms of consequences,
not processes. Froidevaux and Mengin [FM94, Theorem 29] have proved a
result that essentially states that every semantics in which closure is defined
as maximal successfulness is fail-safe. As a result, justified and constrained
default logics are fail-safe.
We recall that we assume that the background theory W is consistent. In
this case, if a semantics is fail-safe, then every default theory has a successful
and closed process: since the process [ ] is successful, a process Π that is
successful and closed exists. The condition of antimonotonicity provides an
algorithm for finding this successful and closed process: if Π is successful and
closed, all its initial fragments are successful as well. We can therefore obtain
a successful and closed process by iteratively adding to [ ] a default that lead
to a successful process.
While all fail-safe semantics give extensions to theories, the converse is
only true in some cases. According to Reiter’s and rational default logics the
simple default theory 〈{ :a
¬a
}, ∅〉 has no extension, and these two semantics
are therefore not fail-safe. On the other hand, every default theory has at
least one concise extension [Ryc91], while the semantics of concise extensions
is not fail-safe, as shown by the following example.
T = 〈{d1, d2}, ∅〉
where
d1 =
: x
x
d2 =
: x ∧ y
x ∧ y
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The default d1 is applicable to W = ∅; the default d2 is applicable to [d1]
because d2 is not subsumed by d1. On the other hand, the process [d1, d2] is
not concise, as d1 is subsumed by d2. As a result, [d1] is a successful process,
but is not the initial part of any successful and closed process under the
semantics of concise extensions.
2.2 Translations
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which fail-safe semantics are less
expressive than fail-prone ones. In particular, we study whether one of the
two facts below can be proved:
1. every theory under an arbitrary regular default semantics can be trans-
lated into a normal default theory under Reiter’s semantics;
2. there are theories under Reiter’s semantics that cannot be translated
into whichever fail-safe semantics.
Since Reiter’s default logic is fail-safe when restricting to normal defaults,
the existence of a translation of the first kind implies that every regular de-
fault semantics can be translated into at least one fail-safe semantics. How-
ever, the restriction to normal defaults makes such a result more general.
Since most of the semantics for default logic behave like Reiter’s on nor-
mal defaults (an exception is Rychlik’s concise semantics [Ryc91], which is
however not fail-safe), this result extends to all these semantics. In order
to simplify the terminology, we formally define “normal default logic” as a
semantics for default logic.
Definition 3 Normal default logic is the restriction of Reiter’s default logic
to the case of normal defaults.
Ideally, we would like results of the first kind to be exactly the converse
of the second one, i.e., every regular semantics can be translated into ev-
ery fail-safe semantics. This general question has however an easy (and of
little significance) negative answer: the semantics that has [ ] as the only
successful and closed process is fail-safe, but none of the considered seman-
tics can be translated into it. Indeed, consequence-preserving translations
are impossible in polynomial time because entailment is coNP-complete in
this semantics but Πp2-complete in most semantics; faithful translations are
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impossible because this semantics always gives a single extension to a theory
while the other one may give more.
The results about the existence of translations depend on what we require
from the translations. A minimal requirement is that the consequences are
preserved. At the other extreme, we may require a translation to preserve
the set of processes. In between, and this is perhaps the most interesting
case, we have the preservation of the extensions.
Consequence-Preserving: we want to obtain the same consequences of
the original theory;
Extension-Preserving (Faithful): we want a bijective correspondence be-
tween the extensions;
Process-Preserving: bijective correspondence between the processes.
In all three cases, we assume that new variables can be introduced, as it
is common in translations between logics. Technically, this is possible thanks
to the concept of var-equivalence [LLM03].
Definition 4 Two formulae α and β are var-equivalent w.r.t. variables X if
and only if α |= γ iff β |= γ for every formula γ that only contains variables
in X.
In plain terms, two formulae are var-equivalent if and only if their conse-
quences, if restricted to be formulae on a given alphabet, are the same.
The translations we consider may introduce new variables: a theory
〈D,W 〉 that only contains variables X is translated into a default theory
〈D′,W ′〉 that contains variables X ∪ Y . Preservation is assumed to hold
modulo var-equivalence: preserving the extensions means that each exten-
sion of 〈D,W 〉 is var-equivalent to an extension of 〈D′,W ′〉 w.r.t. X , and vice
versa; preserving the consequences means that 〈D,W 〉 |= γ iff 〈D′,W ′〉 |= γ
for each formula γ that only contains variables in X . Faithful translations
based on var-equivalence of extensions have been considered by Delgrande
and Schaub [DS03] and by Janhunen [Jan98, Jan03].
The condition of process preservation requires a suitable correspondence
of sequences of defaults. We assume that the defaults are numbered, both in
the original and in the generated theory. We could then enforce the conse-
quences being the same or being var-equivalent; this is however not necessary
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as polynomial process-preserving translations will be proved not to exist any-
way.
A condition on translations that has been considered by several authors
is that of modularity [Imi87, Got95, Jan03], which requires only the defaults
to be translated. Formally, a default theory 〈D,W 〉 should be translated
into a theory 〈D′,W ′∪W 〉, where 〈D′,W ′〉 is the result of translating 〈D, ∅〉.
Another condition on translations that has been considered in the past is that
of locality [Kon88]: each sentence and each default is translated separately.
We do not consider modularity and locality in this paper.
A requirement we impose on the translations is that of being polynomial.
There are two possible definitions of polynomiality, depending on what is
required to be polynomial: the running time or the produced output. This
difference is important, as some translations require exponential time but
still output a polynomially large theory. Formally, two kinds of translations
are considered.
polynomial: run in polynomial time;
polysize: produce a polynomially large result.
The existence of translations depends both on what we want to preserve
(consequences, extensions, or processes), and also on which computational
condition we set (polynomial time or size.) The results proved in this paper
are summarized in Table 1.
Polynomial-time Polysize
Almost consequence-preserving yes yes
Consequence-preserving no yes
Faithful (extension-preserving) no yes
Process-preserving no no
Table 1: Translatability from regular to fail-safe semantics.
2.3 Theories Having No Extensions
Some semantics for default logics, like Reiter’s, may not have extensions even
if W is consistent. On the other hand, all fail-safe default semantics have
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extensions. As a simple result, there is no way for translating all theories from
Reiter’s default logics into any fail-safe semantics in general. This argument
has been used to prove that Reiter’s default logics cannot be translated into
justified or constrained default logic by Delgrande and Schaub [DS03], and
that semi-normal default theories cannot always be translated into normal
default theories by Janhunen [Jan03].
These results are however only consequences of the property of having or
not having extensions, not of the property of fail-safeness. For example, we
could define a default theory to always have [ ] as a successful and closed
process if no other one exists, and this change would not affect the fail-
safeness of the semantics. As a result, we do not use the possible lack of
extensions to prove the impossibility of translations.
In facts, the problem of the possible lack of extensions can be ignored by
simply assuming that the default theory to translate has extensions. This
simple assumption makes it possible some translations that are otherwise
impossible: for example, there exists a poly-size faithful translation from
Reiter’s default logics into normal or justified default logic if we restrict
to default theories having extensions. In the rest of this paper, we only
consider theories having extensions.
3 Translations
In this section, we show two translations from an arbitrary regular semantics
into a normal default theory. The first one is a poly-size faithful translation;
the second one is a polynomial translation that is “almost” consequence-
preserving. Both translations are based on the idea of “simulating” the
construction of processes of the original theory. We first show how this
simulation can be done, and then apply it for obtaining the two translations.
3.1 Simulation of Defaults
The reductions we show are based on simulating a regular semantics using
only normal defaults. Before going into the technical details, we explain
the basic idea of the translation. For each default of the original theory,
we introduce two variables that represent the application of the default in
the original theory. Once the value of these variables are set, we can use
other defaults for checking successfulness and closure of the original process.
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The fact that extensions are generated only when the process is known to be
successful and closed is taken into account in two ways:
1. we use new variables, and draw conclusions on the original variables
only when we know that the simulated process is successful and closed;
2. if the simulated process is not successful or not closed, the extension we
generate is a formula F ; the specific choice of F depends on whether
we want a faithful or an almost-consequence-preserving translation, as
will be explained in the next sections.
Given a default theory 〈D,W 〉 and a formula F , both built over the al-
phabet X , we generate a normal default theory 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that each
extension of 〈D,W 〉 is var-equivalent to an extension of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 w.r.t. X ,
and each extension of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 is var-equivalent either to F or to an exten-
sion of 〈D,W 〉 w.r.t. X . Since all var-equivalences are w.r.t. X , we often
omit the part “w.r.t. X” in what follows.
Given 〈D,W 〉 and a specific regular semantics, the conditions of success-
fulness and closure of a process Π can be expressed as a number of consistency
checks over the formulae of 〈D,W 〉 and Π. Let ω1, . . . , ωu be the formulae to
be checked for consistency. These formulae may depend on which defaults
are in Π, i.e., they are not exactly boolean formulae, as they may include the
propositions like (di ∈ Π), where di ∈ D. The successfulness and closure of
a process can be checked in polynomial time given the results of these con-
sistency checks. By a well-known result in circuit complexity [BS90], every
polynomial boolean function can be expressed by a circuit of polynomial size.
The first steps of the translations are:
1. for each di ∈ D, we introduce two new variables ci and ei;
2. we introduce m + 1 sets of new variables X0, X1, . . . , Xm, where
m = |D|; each of these sets Xi is in bijective correspondence with X ;
3. for each formula ωi, we consider the formula δi that is obtained by
replacing each term (dj ∈ Π) with cj in ωi, i.e., δi = ωi[(dj ∈ Π)/cj ];
4. we build the circuit C(o1, . . . , ou, c1, . . . , cm) that encodes the success-
fulness and closure tests, where the input variables o1, . . . , om represent
the results of the consistency checks and each ci encodes the presence
of di in the process to be checked.
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We give an example of the formulae δi and the circuit C used for trans-
lating 〈D,W 〉 from Reiter’s semantics into normal default logic. The con-
sistency checks to be done are u = 2m, where m is the number of defaults.
Namely, for each default di =
αi:βi
γi
we have to check the consistency of the
following formulae:
ωi = W ∧

 ∧
dj∈D
(dj ∈ Π) → γj

 ∧ βi
ωm+i = W ∧

 ∧
dj∈D
(dj ∈ Π) → γj

 ∧ αi
The formulae δi are obtained by replacing di ∈ Π with ci, and are therefore
the following ones:
δi = W ∧

 ∧
dj∈D
cj → γj

 ∧ βi
δm+i = W ∧

 ∧
dj∈D
cj → γj

 ∧ αi
The circuit C(o1, . . . , ou, c1, . . . , cm) encodes the successfulness and clo-
sure of a process, provided that the consistency of δi is represented by the
value of oi and the presence of di in the process is represented by the value
of ci. For Reiter’s default logic, we have:
C(o1, . . . , ou, c1, . . . , cm) =
∧
di∈D
[
(ci → oi) ∧ (¬ci → (om+1 ∨ ¬oi))
]
In words, for each default di ∈ D, if di is in Π (i.e., ci is true) then the
justification of di must be consistent with the consequences of all defaults in
Π, (i.e., oi is true). If di 6∈ D (i.e., ci is false), then either the precondition of
di is not entailed (i.e., om+1) or its justification is not consistent (i.e., ¬oi).
What has been shown are the formulae δi and the circuit C for the par-
ticular case of Reiter’s semantics. Similar definitions can be given for every
regular semantics. The default theory that results from the translation is the
following one.
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〈DFu ,Wu〉 = 〈A ∪N ∪ V ∪G ∪ Z,W [X/X0]〉
Let the defaults of the original theory be D = {d1, . . . , dm}, and let
di =
αi:βi
γi
. The defaults of the translated theory DFu are defined as follows.
A = {ai | di ∈ D}; each default ai represents the application of the default
di in the simulated process:
ai =
αi[X/X0] : γi[X/X0] ∧ ci ∧ ei
γi[X/X0] ∧ ci ∧ ei
N = {ni | di ∈ D}; each default ni represents the choice of not applying the
default di:
ni =
: ¬ci ∧ ei
¬ci ∧ ei
V = {v1, . . . , vu}; each vi relates the consistency of δi with the value of the
variable oi:
vi =
e1 ∧ · · · ∧ em : δi[X/Xi] ∧ oi ∧ ti
δi[X/Xi] ∧ oi ∧ ti
G = {g1, . . . , gu}; each gi relates the inconsistency of δi with the value of oi:
gi =
e1 ∧ · · · ∧ em ∧ ¬δi[X/Xi] : ¬oi ∧ ti
¬oi ∧ ti
Z = {z1, z2}; these two defaults are used to compute the result of the circuit
C and to “output” the generated extension or F accordingly:
z1 =
e1 ∧ · · · ∧ em ∧ t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tu ∧ C(o1, . . . , ou, c1, . . . , cm) :W ∧
∧
di∈D
(ci → γi)
W ∧
∧
di∈D(ci → γi)
z2 =
e1 ∧ · · · ∧ em ∧ t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tu ∧ ¬C(o1, . . . , ou, c1, . . . , cm) : F
F
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We use the following abbreviations: E for e1∧· · ·∧em and T for t1∧· · ·∧tu.
The preconditions of the defaults inDFu have been defined so that the defaults
of A∪N have to be applied first; then, the defaults of V ∪G can be applied;
the defaults of Z can be applied only at the end. We prove a number of
lemmas relating the processes of the theory 〈DFu ,Wu〉 with the processes of
〈D,W 〉.
Lemma 1 If Π is a successful and closed process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉, then Π con-
tains exactly one among ai or ni for each i, and contains them only in the
first m positions.
Proof. Since all defaults in DFu \(A∪N) contain E as a precondition, and E
is only made true once m defaults of A ∪N are applied, the first m defaults
of Π are in A∪N . If both ai and ni are in Π, then Π is not successful, as the
consequences of these defaults contradicts each other. If neither ai nor ni are
in Π, then the default ni is applicable; therefore, Π is not a closed process.
Finally, since exactly one between ai and ni is in the first m positions of Π,
no other defaults of A ∪N can be in a position of Π after the m-th.
In words, the processes of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 begin with the application of exactly
one between ai or ni for each i. After that, no other default of A∪N can be
applied. The idea is that the truth value of ci reflects the application of di
in the default theory 〈D,W 〉. Given a process Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉, we define the
“simulated process” O(Π) to be the following process of 〈D,W 〉:
O(Π) = [di1 , . . . , dik ] where ai1 , . . . , aik is the sequence of defaults ai of Π
We prove that O(Π) is a process of the original theory 〈D,W 〉.
Lemma 2 For every process Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉, O(Π) is a process of 〈D,W 〉.
Proof. By assumption, Π is a process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉. As a result, Wu∪cons(Π)
is consistent and Wu ∪ cons(Π[d]) |= prec(d) for every d ∈ Π. These two
conditions imply the same ones onW and O(Π) once the inverse substitution
[X0/X ] has been applied.
The converse of this lemma also holds.
Lemma 3 For each process Π′ of 〈D,W 〉, there exists a successful and closed
process Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) = Π
′.
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Proof. Let Π1 be the process obtained by replacing each di with ai in Π
′
and adding all ni’s such that di 6∈ Π
′. This process Π1 is successful, and
O(Π1) = Π
′. Since 〈DFu ,Wu〉 is normal, Π1 is the prefix of a successful and
closed process Π1 · Π2. Since Π1 already contains m defaults, no default of
Π2 is in A ∪ N . As a result, O(Π1 · Π2) is equal to O(Π1), which is in turn
equal to Π′.
Together, these lemmas prove that the processes of 〈D,W 〉 are in cor-
respondence with the successful and closed processes of 〈DFu ,Wu〉. Namely,
each process Π′ of 〈D,W 〉 corresponds to some successful and closed pro-
cesses Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) = Π
′, and for each successful and
closed processes Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉, it holds that O(Π) is a process of 〈D,W 〉.
What is still missing is the effect of the successfulness and closure of the
process of 〈D,W 〉 on the corresponding processes of 〈DFu ,Wu〉. We prove
two preliminary lemmas
Lemma 4 Every successful and closed process Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 contains either
vi or gi, but not both, for every i, in the positions of Π from the m+ 1-th to
the m+ u-th.
Proof. As for Lemma 1, after applying the first m defaults the formula E is
true but T is not. As a result, we can only apply defaults in V ∪G. The rest
of the proof is like that of Lemma 1.
Lemma 5 If Π′ is a process of 〈D,W 〉 and Π is a successful and closed
process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) = Π
′, then cons(Π) entails oi or ¬oi
depending on whether Π′ satisfies ωi.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, the first m defaults of Π are in A ∪ N
and the next u defaults are in V ∪ G. Since O(Π) = Π′, aj ∈ Π if and
only if dj ∈ Π
′, and nj ∈ Π if and only if dj 6∈ Π
′. As a result, cons(Π)
contains either cj or ¬cj , depending on whether dj ∈ Π
′. Since the value of
each cj indicates the presence of dj ∈ Π
′, the satisfiability of the formulae δi
corresponds to the satisfaction of the conditions ωi.
By construction, the default vi is only applicable if δi is consistent, which
means that Π′ satisfies the condition ωi. For the same reason, gi is applicable
only if ωi is not satisfied. As a result, cons(Π) contains either oi or ¬oi
depending on whether Π′ satisfies the condition ωi.
We now establish a correspondence on the conditions of successfulness
and closure.
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Lemma 6 If Π′ is a successful and closed process of 〈D,W 〉 and Π is a
successful and closed process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) = Π
′, then Wu ∧
cons(Π) and W ∧ cons(Π′) are var-equivalent w.r.t. X.
Proof. The precondition of z1 and z2 include E ∧ T and either C(. . .) or
¬C(. . .), respectively. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, E ∧ T is entailed by
cons(Π). By Lemma 5, the truth value of each oi is related to the process
Π′ satisfying the condition ωi; since Π
′ is successful and closed, C evaluates
to true. Therefore, z1 is applicable while z2 is not. Since Π is successful and
closed, z1 is in Π. The var-equivalence of Wu ∧ cons(Π) with W ∧ cons(Π
′)
is due to the fact that the consequence of z1 is equivalent the latter formula
after having replaced each ci with either true or false, depending on whether
ai ∈ Π.
The converse of this lemma also holds.
Lemma 7 If Π′ is a process of 〈D,W 〉 that is either not successful or not
closed and Π is a successful and closed process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) =
Π′, then Wu ∧ cons(Π) is var-equivalent to F w.r.t. X.
Proof. Same as the proof of the previous theorem, but C this time evaluates
to false. Therefore Π includes z2, which has F as a consequence.
These lemmas establish a correspondence between the extensions of the
original and generated theories.
Theorem 1 Every extension of 〈D,W 〉 is var-equivalent to an extension of
〈DFu ,Wu〉 and every extension of 〈D
F
u ,Wu〉 is var-equivalent either to F or
to an extension of 〈D,W 〉.
Proof. If Π′ is a successful and closed process of 〈D,W 〉, then there exists
a closed and successful process Π of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 such that O(Π) = Π
′ by
Lemma 3. By Lemma 6, it holds that the extension generated by Π is var-
equivalent to that generated by Π′.
If Π is a closed and successful process of 〈DFu ,Wu〉, by Lemma 2 O(Π)
is a process of 〈D,W 〉. If O(Π) is successful and closed, by Lemma 6, the
extension generated by Π is var-equivalent to that generated by Π′. If O(Π)
is either not successful or not closed, by Lemma 7, the extension generated
by Π is var-equivalent to F .
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3.2 Faithful (Extension-Preserving) Translations
Delgrande and Schaub [DS03] have proved that Reiter’s default logic can-
not be translated into justified default logic. Janhunen [Jan03] has proved
that semi-normal defaults cannot be translated into normal defaults under
Reiter’s semantics. Both results imply the impossibility of translating Re-
iter’s semantics into a fail-safe semantics. However, both proofs are based on
the possible lack of extensions in Reiter’s semantics. We therefore investigate
whether theories having extensions under Reiter’s semantics can be faithfully
translated into a fail-safe default theory, namely, normal default logic.
A faithful, but exponential, translation from every regular default logic
semantics into normal default logics always exists: if the extensions of the
original theories are obtained by the deductive closure of the formulae in
{E1, . . . , Em}, the following theory is a faithful translation of it into normal
default logic, where the ei’s are new variables.
T =
〈{
: ei ∧ Ei ∧
∧
j=1,...,m j 6=i ¬ej
ei ∧ Ei ∧
∧
j=1,...,m j 6=i ¬ej
∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, . . . , m
}
, ∅
〉
This theory contains exactly one default for each extension of the original
theory. Since these defaults are normal, and their justifications are inconsis-
tent with each other, the successful and closed processes of this theory are
exactly the sequences composed of a single default. The generated extensions
are exactly the same (modulo var-equivalence) of the original theory.
The problem with this translation is not only that it is exponential: even
worst, once the set of all extensions {Ei} has been determined, there is no
reason for using default logic, as we can simply use propositional logic instead.
Polynomial translations can be of two kinds: either the new theory can
be built in polynomial time, or it has polynomial size. The first condition
implies the second, but not vice versa. A translation from a regular semantics
into normal default logic exists if we only require the result of the translation
to be polynomial in size.
Theorem 2 For every regular semantics there exists a poly-size faithful (extension-
preserving) translation that maps all default theories that have extensions into
normal default theories.
Proof. The simulation shown in Section 3.1 is “almost” an extension-preserving
translation. Indeed, all extensions of the original theory are translated into
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extensions of the generated theory. On the other hand, processes of the
original theory that do not generate extensions correspond to processes that
generate F as an extension.
We can build a faithful translation as follows: first, we determine a single
successful and closed process Π of the original theory. We then translate
the default theory 〈D,W 〉 into the simulating theory 〈DFu ,Wu〉 in which
F = W ∧ cons(Π). This is a faithful translation because each successful and
closed process of the original theory 〈D,W 〉 corresponds to a successful and
closed process of the theory 〈DFu ,Wu〉 generating the same extension (modulo
var-equivalence). The processes of 〈D,W 〉 that are either not successful or
not closed correspond to processes of 〈DFu ,Wu〉 that generate an extension
that is var-equivalent to F . Since F is an extension of the original theory,
this translation is faithful.
The translation of this theorem is not polynomial-time, as it requires the
generation of at least one successful and closed process of the original theory.
On the other hand, such a process has always polynomial size. The result of
the translation is therefore always of polynomial size. As will be shown later
in the paper, no consequence-preserving polynomial-time translation exists.
This implies that no faithful and polynomial-time translation exists as well.
3.3 Almost-Consequence-Preserving Translations
A simple computational argument shows that any default theory can be
translated into a normal default theory in polynomial time if we admit the
queries to be translated as well, i.e., 〈D,W 〉 |= q in a regular semantics if
and only if 〈D′,W ′〉 |= q′, where D′ is normal. Indeed, query answering is in
Πp2 for all regular default logics and Π
p
2-hard for Reiter’s default logic even in
the restriction to normal theories [Got92, Sti92]. However, for a translation
to be “exactly” consequence-preserving q′ should be the same as q.
A consequence-preserving translation is easy to give if we allow an expo-
nential blow up of the theory: if the extensions of 〈D,W 〉 are {E1, . . . , Em},
the skeptical consequences of 〈D,W 〉 are exactly the classical consequences
of E1 ∨ · · · ∨ Em, which are also the skeptical consequences of the default
theory 〈∅, {E1 ∨ · · · ∨ Em}〉. Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [BED96] defined a
better translation from default logic into propositional logic, which can be
polynomial even if the number of extensions is exponential. Translations
from default logic into propositional logic are however known to be exponen-
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tial in the worst case due to the different complexity of the semantics. We
now concentrate on polynomial translations.
The case of default theories having no extensions has already been con-
sidered, so we restrict to theories that have extensions. We have already
shown a faithful translation that is poly-size: this translation clearly pre-
serves the consequences as well. In this section, we show a translation from
every regular semantics into normal default logic that is:
1. polynomial-time;
2. “almost” consequence preserving: if 〈D,W 〉 is the original theory and
〈D′,W ′〉 is the result of the translation, then 〈D,W 〉 |= q if and only if
〈D′,W ′〉 |= a∨ q, where a is a new variable created by the translation.
The translation is based on the theory that simulates the process construc-
tion of the original theory. As we have already noticed, the only problem
with this simulation is that the processes of the original theory that either are
not successful or not closed correspond to successful and closed processes in
the simulating theory. Since these processes generate Cn(F ) as an extension,
all we have to do is to specify a value of F that do not affect entailment.
The trick we use is to translate q into a ∨ q and to set F = a. If we
use the skeptical semantics, the extensions of the simulating theory that do
not correspond to extensions of the original theory imply a, which in turn
implies a ∨ q; as a result, they do not affect the consequences of the theory.
Theorem 3 For every regular default logic there exists a polynomial-time
translation that maps a default theory 〈D,W 〉 that has extensions into a nor-
mal default theory 〈D′,W ′〉 such that 〈D,W 〉 |= q if and only if 〈D′,W ′〉 |=
a ∨ q, where a is a new variable.
The formula F and the way in which queries are translated are chosen in
such a way the extensions of 〈D′,W ′〉 that do not correspond to extensions
of the original theory 〈D,W 〉 are irrelevant to the specific query evaluation
mechanism. As a result, if we are interested into credulous entailment, we
can use F = ¬a and translate a query q into a ∧ q
The question of whether the addition of a to the queries is necessary
depends on the kind of translation used: we have already shown a faithful
(and, therefore, consequence-preserving) translation that is poly-size. We
will show that no polynomial-time consequence-preserving (i.e., that do not
modify queries at all) translation exists unless part of the polynomial hier-
archy collapses.
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4 Impossibility of Translations
In this section, we show that some translations are impossible: namely,
there is no polynomial-time exact consequence-preserving translation and
no polynomial-time or polysize process-preserving translation from Reiter’s
default logics into any fail-safe default logic.
4.1 Consequence-Preserving Translations
We have already shown a poly-size faithful translation and a polynomial-time
almost-consequence-preserving translation. We prove that no polynomial-
time reduction that preserves the consequences exactly exists. To this end, we
show a problem that is hard for Reiter’s default logic but easy for all fail-safe
default semantics. We cannot use a problem that has already been analyzed
in the past (such as entailment or model checking) because these problems
have the same complexity for Reiter’s and for some fail-safe semantics.
For all fail-safe semantics, generating an extension is relatively easy, as it
can be done by applying defaults until the process is closed. This property
can be used to define a problem that is hard for Reiter’s semantics but easy
for all fail-safe ones: if it is known that either all extensions imply a or
all extensions imply ¬a, then a single arbitrary extension suffices to check
whether a is entailed. In turns, the assumption that all extensions imply a
or all extensions imply ¬a is equivalent to the assumption that the default
theory implies either a or ¬a. We prove that entailment is hard for Reiter’s
default logic even under this assumption.
Theorem 4 The problem of checking whether 〈D,W 〉 |= a in Reiter’s de-
fault logic is Σp2 ∩ Π
p
2-hard even if 〈D,W 〉 implies either a or ¬a, and it has
extensions.
Proof. Let P be a problem in Σp2 ∩ Π
p
2. We reduce the problem of telling
whether x ∈ P to the problem T |= a, where T is a default theory that either
implies a or it implies ¬a.
Since P it is in Σp2, the question x ∈ P can be reduced to the problem
of checking the existence of extensions of a default theory with an empty
background theory 〈Dp, ∅〉 [Got92]. Since P is in Π
p
2, its complementary
problem is in Σp2 as well. As a result, the question x 6∈ P can therefore be
reduced to the existence of extensions of another theory 〈Dn, ∅〉. Therefore,
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x ∈ P if and only if 〈Dp, ∅〉 has extensions while 〈Dn, ∅〉 has not, and vice
versa if x 6∈ P .
Let a be a variable that is mentioned neither in Dp nor in Dn. The default
theory we use is the following one:
T = 〈D, ∅〉
where
D =
{
: a
a
,
: ¬a
¬a
}
∪
{
a ∧ prec(d) : just(d)
cons(d)
∣∣∣∣∣ d ∈ Dp
}
∪
{
¬a ∧ prec(d) : just(d)
cons(d)
∣∣∣∣∣ d ∈ Dn
}
The only two defaults that can be applied from the background theory are
the first two. They cannot be applied together, however. Once the first one
is applied, the theory becomes equivalent to 〈Dp, {a}〉, while the application
of the second one makes it equivalent to 〈Dn, {¬a}〉. Since the existence of
extensions for these two theories are related to the question x ∈ P , we have:
1. if x ∈ P , all extensions of T imply a;
2. if x 6∈ P , all extensions of T imply ¬a.
As a result, either T |= a or T |= ¬a; in particular, T |= a if and only if
x ∈ P .
The same problem is relatively easy for every fail-safe default semantics.
Indeed, to solve it we only need to generate an extension and to check whether
it implies a or ¬a: since all extensions are the same as for the entailment of
a and ¬a, checking one extension suffices. Generating an arbitrary extension
can be done easily in every fail-safe semantics.
Theorem 5 Checking whether T |= a is in ∆p2 for every fail-safe semantics,
if either T |= a or T |= ¬a.
Proof. Since either all extensions of T imply a or all extensions of T imply
¬a, we can check whether T |= a by finding a single extension E of T and
then checking whether E |= a. Finding one extension E is easy because the
semantics is fail-safe. If Π is a successful process that is not closed, then there
exists Π′ such that Π · Π′ is successful and closed. By the antimonotonicity
of successfulness, if d is the first default of Π′, i.e., Π′ = [d] · Π′′, then Π · [d]
is successful. As a result, if Π is successful then it is either closed or there
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exists a default d such that Π · [d] is successful. We can therefore start with
Π = [ ], which is successful. At each step, if Π is closed, we can check whether
cons(Π) |= a. Otherwise, there exists d such that Π · [d] is successful. We
set Π = Π · [d], and continue. This algorithm must necessarily end up with
a successful and closed process.
This algorithm only takes a polynomial number of steps if we have access
to an NP-oracle. Indeed, all we have to do is to check closure of Π and
successfulness of Π · [d] at each step; these conditions can be verified in
polynomial time by letting the NP-oracle perform the consistency tests.
As a result of these two theorems, no polynomial-time consequence-preserving
translation exists from Reiter’s semantics to an arbitrary fail-safe semantics,
unless Σp2 ∩ Π
p
2 = ∆
p
2. The following theorem shows that even a polynomial
number of calls to an NP-oracle do not suffice to translate from Reiter’s
semantics to any fail-safe one.
Theorem 6 If there exists an (exact) consequence-preserving translation from
Reiter’s semantics into any fail-safe semantics that only requires a polyno-
mial number of calls to an NP-oracle, then Σp2 ∩ Π
p
2 = ∆
p
2.
Proof. It such a translation exists, then for any P ∈ Σp2 ∩ Π
p
2 we could
translate the question x ∈ P into the question T |= a under Reiter’s semantics
where either T |= a or T |= ¬a. In turns, with a polynomial number of calls
to the oracle we can translate the question into the same question for a fail-
safe semantics, where it can be solved with a polynomial number of other
calls to the oracle.
Since no translation employing a polynomial number of calls to an NP-
oracle exists, no polynomial-time translation exists either. Since the theorem
has been proved using only theories in which all extensions have the same
behavior w.r.t. the query (either they all entail it, or they all entail their
negation,) this result holds for both skeptical and credulous reasoning.
The impossibility of polynomial-time faithful translations is a consequence
of the above theorem: a faithful translation is also a consequence-preserving
translation, and cannot therefore be polynomial-time.
Theorem 7 If there exists a faithful translation from Reiter’s default logic
into any fail-safe default logic that only requires a polynomial number of calls
to an NP-oracle, then Σp2 ∩Π
p
2 = ∆
p
2.
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4.2 Process-Preserving Translations
A process-preserving translation is a translation that not only preserves the
extensions, but also the processes of a default theory. Clearly, we cannot
enforce the processes to be exactly the same, otherwise the two theories
would have the same defaults. Therefore, we only impose that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the defaults of the original and generated
theories, such that the processes of the original theory matches the processes
of the generated theory thanks to this correspondence.
An easy way for creating this correspondence is to assume that the first
part D of a default theory 〈D,W 〉 is a sequence of defaults rather than a
set. In other words, we add an enumeration on the defaults so that we
can write D = {d1, . . . , dm}. A process-preserving translation is a func-
tion that maps a default theory 〈{d1, . . . , dm},W 〉 into another default the-
ory 〈{d′1, . . . , d
′
m},W
′〉 with the same number of defaults, and such that
[di1, . . . , dir ] is a successful and closed process of the first theory if and only
if [d′i1 , . . . , d
′
ir
] is a successful and closed process of the second one.
We prove that there is no polynomial-time or polysize process-preserving
translation from Reiter’s default logics into any fail-safe default logic. To
this aim, we show a problem that is hard in Reiter’s default logic but easy
in all fail-safe semantics.
Definition 5 (Completability of Process) Given a default theory 〈D,W 〉
and a sequence of defaults Π, check whether there exists a successful a com-
plete process Π · Π′.
The following theorem characterizes the complexity of completability of
processes for Reiter’s semantics.
Theorem 8 The problem of completability of processes is Σp2-complete in
Reiter’s default logic even for theories that have extensions.
Proof. Membership: guess a sequence of defaults Π′ and check whether Π ·Π′
is a successful and closed process.
Hardness: we reduce the problem of existence of extensions to this one.
Given a theory 〈D,W 〉 we build the theory 〈D′,W 〉, where D′ = {dn, dp}∪D
′′
and dn, dp, and D
′′ are defined as follows.
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dn =
: ¬a
¬a
dp =
: a
a
D′′ =
{
a ∧ prec(d) : just(d)
cons(d)
∣∣∣∣∣ d ∈ D
}
This theory, as required, has one extension: the one generated by the
process [dn]. The other processes, if any, are made of dp followed by the
defaults that corresponds to the successful and closed processes of 〈D,W 〉.
As a result, the consistent process [dp] can be extended to form a consistent
and closed process if and only if 〈D,W 〉 has extensions.
The problem of completability of extensions is relatively easy for all fail-
safe semantics, as it amounts to checking whether Π is a successful process.
By definition, indeed, any successful process is either closed or can be ex-
tended to form a successful process. Moreover, if Π is not a process, or it is
not successful, then it cannot be extended to generate a successful process
thanks to the anti-monotonicity of successfulness.
As a result, completability of processes is equivalent to verifying whether
a sequence of defaults is a successful process, which is a problem in ∆p2. For
the fail-safe semantics defined in the literature, the problem is even simpler,
as it is in Dp. We prove that is hard for the same class for justified default
logic for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 9 Checking whether Π is a successful process is in ∆p2 for every
regular default semantics, and is Dp-complete for justified default logic.
Proof. The conditions of Π being a process and being successful can be
computed in polynomial time once a number of consistency tests have been
performed. The problem is therefore in ∆p2. For the case of justified default
logic, these consistency tests are independent to each other, that is, the
formulae to check do not depend to the results of the other tests. As a
result, the problem is in Dp.
The hardness result is an obvious consequence of the fact that the ap-
plicability of a single default is hard: the problem sat-unsat, i.e., checking
whether a pair of formulae 〈α, β〉 is composed of a satisfiable formula α and
an unsatisfiable formula β, is Dp-hard. This problem can indeed be reduced
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to the problem of checking whether [d] is a successful and closed process of
the theory below:
〈{
¬β : α
α
}
, ∅
〉
The sequence of defaults [d] is indeed a successful process if and only if
¬β is valid (that is, β is inconsistent) and α is consistent. As a result, the
problem is Dp-hard.
Suppose that there exists a process-preserving translation from Reiter’s
default logic to any fail-safe default logics. We can then solve the problem of
completability of a process Π in Reiter’s default logic by simply translating
both the theory and the process, and then solving the problem in the fail-safe
default semantics. This would imply that Σp2=∆
p
2.
This result can be strengthened to polysize translations. We can in-
deed prove that the problem of completability of processes does not simplify
thanks to a preprocessing phase. This is proved by showing that the problem
of completability of processes is ‖❀Σp2-hard for Reiter’s default logics, and
cannot therefore be “compiled to” ∆p2. The class ‖❀Σ
p
2 has been introduced
by Cadoli et al. [CDLS02, Lib01] to characterize the complexity of problems
when preprocessing of problem is allowed. We omit the details here, and
refer the reader to the papers by Cadoli et al. [CDLS02, Lib01].
Theorem 10 The problem of completability of processes is ‖❀Σp2-complete
in Reiter’s default logic, where the default theory is the fixed part of the
instance.
Proof. We adapt the reduction by Gottlob, as follows: given a formula
∃X∀Y . ¬φ, where |X| = |Y | = n and φ contains only clauses of three
literals, let A = {γ1, . . . , γm} be the set of all clauses of three literals over
the alphabet X ∪ Y ; we build a default theory and a successful process of it
as follows:
T = 〈{pi, ni | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {ai, bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {f},W 〉
where :
pi =
: ci ∧ ei
ci ∧ ei
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ni =
: ¬ci ∧ ei
¬ci ∧ ei
ai =
: xi ∧ fi
xi ∧ fi
bi =
: ¬xi ∧ fi
¬xi ∧ fi
f =
∧
ei ∧
∧
fi : {ci → γi | γi ∈ A}
false
W = ∅
Π = [d1, . . . , dm]
where di is pi if γ ∈ φ and ni otherwise
The sequence Π is always a successful process. Moreover, W ∧ cons(Π)
implies all variables ei and either ci or ¬ci. Namely, ci is entailed if pi is
in Π, and ¬ci is entailed otherwise. We can therefore replace each ci such
that γi ∈ φ with true and each ci such that γi 6∈ φ with false. The default f
therefore simplifies to:
f ′ =
∧
fi : {γi | γi ∈ φ}
false
As shown by Gottlob, the resulting theory has extensions if and only if
∃X∀Y . ¬φ. This is therefore a polynomial translation from ∃∀QBF into the
problem of completability of a process. Moreover, the default theory only
depends on the number of variables of the QBF, while the process is the
only part that depends on the specific φ. As a result, this is a ‖❀-reduction,
and proves that the problem of completability of processes is ‖❀Σp2-hard.
Since the problem is in Σp2, it is in ‖❀Σ
p
2 as well. As a result, the problem is
‖❀Σp2-complete.
This theorem proves that no polysize process-preserving translation from
Reiter’s semantics into any fail-safe semantics exists. Indeed, if this were
the case, we could translate any theory from Reiter’s default logics into a
theory that has the same successful and closed processes under a fail-safe
semantics. This would prove that the problem is in ‖❀∆p2, which implies that
‖❀Πp2 = ‖❀Σ
p
2, and therefore the polynomial hierarchy collapses [CDLS02].
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5 Conclusions
The possibility for a default logic semantics to make a sequence of applicable
defaults to fail can be seen as a semantical drawback or as a computational
feature. In this paper, we have studied how much a semantics gains from this
ability to generate failures. In particular, we have restricted to the case of
theories having extensions, and have shown that translations from fail-prone
to fail-safe semantics are possible or not depending on the constraints that are
imposed on the translation. In particular, a translation that preserves the
extensions or the skeptical consequences and produces a polynomial sized
result exists, while a polynomial-time translation does not. We have also
considered more liberal (almost-consequence-preserving) and more restrictive
(process-preserving) constraints on the translations.
The main results of this paper imply that the ability of failing can only
give an advantage in terms of translation time (e.g., not all Reiter’s theories
can be faithfully translated into normal or justified theories in polynomial
time), but not in terms of expressibility (e.g., for every Reiter’s theory there
exists an equivalent normal or justified theory of polynomial size.) This
distinction is important, because it shows that fail-prone semantics are better
than fail-safe ones in solving problems by translating them into default logic,
but are not in terms of which domains can be encoded in polynomial space.
In short, the possible failure of processes is a computational advantage, but
not an expressiveness advantage.
These results hold only under some assumptions: the reductions are con-
strained to be polynomial (either in time or space) but can introduce new
variables. Moreover, we only consider theories that have extensions, and
prove the existence of translations only for normal default logic, which we
considered a prototypical fail-safe semantics. These assumptions make the
results of this paper incomparable to what proved in two similar works:
1. Delgrande and Schaub [DS03] have shown reductions from other vari-
ants of default logics into Reiter’s; they take into account theories hav-
ing no extensions, and limit to the specific case of justified, constrained,
and rational default logic;
2. Janhunen [Jan03] has shown that Reiter’s default logic can be trans-
lated into semi-normal default logic; translations are assumed not only
faithful but also modular, and theories having no extensions are taken
into account.
29
Both these two works consider polynomial faithful translations with new
variables. The results presented in our paper are more general than the
ones above in the sense that we proved the existence of translations from an
arbitrary regular default theory into a fail-safe one and the non-existence of
a translation from Reiter’s semantics into an arbitrary fail-safe one.
Some apparent contradictions between the results proved in this paper
and those by Delgrande and Schaub and by Janhunen are due to the fact
that we only consider default theories having extensions. This is why, for
example, some results about the impossibility of translations by Delgrande
and Schaub [DS03, Theorem 6] and by Janhunen [Jan03, Theorem 5], which
relies on the possible non-existence of extensions in Reiter’s semantics, are
not in contradiction with our results on the existence of such reductions.
These apparent contradictions show that some translations are only impos-
sible because of the possible lack of extensions, and become possible as soon
as theories having no extensions are excluded from consideration.
An interesting question left open by the present work is whether the
comparison between fail-safe and fail-prone semantics can be extended to
logics that are not based on defaults. Clearly, a suitable definition of fail-
ure is needed; however, it seems somehow natural to consider propositional
circumscription [Lif94] as a fail-safe non-monotonic logic (we add negative
literals to a theory as far as possible, but never retract an added literal) and
autoepistemic logic [Moo85] as a fail-prone one (we can “generate” a conclu-
sion x by means of a formula like ✷x → x but then retract the conclusion, if
a condition F is met, by means of a formula like F → ¬x.)
Finally, we note that frameworks for comparing propositional knowledge
representation formalisms have been given by Cadoli et al. [CDLS00] and by
Penna [Pen00]. The translations considered in these framework are allowed to
translate queries (or models), while the only translation of queries admitted
in this paper is the addition of a literal to queries, i.e., q is translated into a∨q.
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